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This article contributes to the growing literature on the use computer mediated 
communications to research illicit markets. In it, we conduct an analysis of the 
British cannabis market using data crowdsourced from a publicly available 
platform, PriceofWeed.com. Crowd-sourced transaction data presents some new 
insights into the British cannabis market. First, this study has tracked the 
trafficking flow of cannabis within the UK. Second, it shows the extent to which 
a quantity discount is granted to consumers. Third, it discusses purchasing 
habits of cannabis users. Conclusions suggest new areas of application of 
crowdsourcing to research hard to reach and deviant populations.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, social media data emerged as an important, additional source of information 
for social science research. Gantz and Reinsel1 estimated that by 2020 the global volume of 
digital data will be 35 zettabytes (3.5 x 1022 bytes), a figure that is 44 times the volume of the 
total digital data that was available in 2010. The ease of uploading information means that 
more digital data is now created every two to seven days than what was generated and 
recorded in the entirety of humankind until 2003 (Griffiths, 2012). These huge streams of 
data represent an unprecedented source of information to examine problems that have 
historically been difficult to study. 
This article contributes to a growing literature on the use of social media and 
computer mediated communications to research crime-related problems and deviant 
populations 2. We conducted an analysis of the British cannabis market using data 
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crowdsourced from a publicly available platform, PriceofWeed.com. The results provide 
insights to cannabis trafficking flows, dealers’ behaviors, and consumers’ purchasing habits 
in the United Kingdom that would not be possible or very expensive to develop using 
traditional data sources.  
This article proceeds as follows: First, we discuss what research strategies of illicit 
drug markets. Second, we show crowdsourcing drug prices can serve as a valid additional 
data source. Third, we illustrate how crowdsourced data mined from priceofweed.com can be 
a viable in terms of predicting prices, by triangulating the data with other, publicly available 
sources. Fourth, we demonstrate how the Price of Weed data can be used to understand 
trafficking flows, the degree to which discounts are given for quantity sold, and the 
purchasing habits of buyers. Finally, we discuss the benefits, limitations, and future 
applications of our approach.  
Researching Illicit Drug Markets 
Researchers have studied illicit drug markets in various ways, including analyzing collated 
data sets, examining court documents, conducting ethnographies and qualitative interviews 3, 
analyzing seizures 4, and surveying drug users 5. Each approach has it benefits and 
limitations. Ethnography, court documents, and qualitative interviews allow researchers to 
conduct a nuanced examination of local drug markets, behaviors of the different participants, 
and social and cultural norms regulating the local drug market. Some scholars even resorted 
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to video footage of narcotics transactions extracted from the closed-circuit television to have 
a less intrusive observation of drug dealers’ behaviors6. Nonetheless, the main limitations 
shared by these approaches is that they are, generally, time consuming, expensive, and lack 
generalizability across marketplaces. Given that markets’ components and characteristics, 
including actors, roles, social and cultural norms within7, are variable, the analysis of any 
given market may not lead to comparative conclusions that are applicable to multiple markets 
or markets of a given region.  
In response, to develop generalizable findings on drug shipment volumes, one 
strategy researchers have employed is to measure drug seizures, which are a function of the 
quantity of drug shipped into a country8. As such, seizure data can be used to estimate the 
national and international supply of illicit drugs. However, the quantity of drugs seized is not 
a straightforward indicator of supply; seizures are the outcome of several factors including 
the relative skill of the interdictors, the care taken by smugglers, and whether the jurisdiction 
is a known transshipment point9. 
Many developed and developing countries estimate drug use prevalence through 
periodic surveys of students and their general population10. Prevalence measures, regarded as 
the best available indicator to understand how well a country is doing in controlling illicit 
drugs11, dominate the literature. However, population surveys have well-known limitations 
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such as nonresponse by those who frequently use drugs, misreporting by those who do report 
use, and unwillingness by many users who do respond to disclose their use12. 
A new line of research has been opened by the recent diffusion of anonymous online 
drug marketplaces (also known as drug cryptomarkets). Several scholars have resorted to 
quantitative methods measuring the economic performances of these markets13 or observing 
forum threads where buyers, vendors, and administrators discuss cryptomarket issues14. 
Nonetheless, despite cryptomarkets’ potential to change the way illicit drugs are bought and 
sold, they only represent a tiny fraction of the illicit drug market15.  
Given some of the limits of alternative data sources, several researchers use drug 
prices as a metric to extrapolate information about drug market dynamics. The three main 
sources of data on drug prices are (1) synthesis reports by national and international agencies 
such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); (2) transaction-level data 
from law enforcement agencies such as the US Drug Enforcement Administration; and, (3) 
self-report data collected from drug users, where respondents report characteristics of their 
transaction such as how much they spent, what they bought, and the quantity purchased16. 
Accordingly, exploiting information on the cost of illicit drug transactions is 
particularly appealing as price data are relatively abundant. Moreover, transaction data can be 
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disaggregated geographically and temporally to investigate specific patterns17. Given its 
versatility, pricing information has been used in a large array of applications including 
estimating the elasticity of demand18, predicting the number of overdoses19, understanding 
how traffickers respond to law enforcement interventions20, and estimating a country’s 
expenditure on illicit drugs21. 
Recently, a data source that tabulates user’s self-reported expenditures, the publicly 
accessibly, clear-web website PriceofWeed.com, has attracted attention among North-
American scholars. This website crowdsources data on cannabis transactions, including how 
much users spent, what kind of cannabis product they bought, and the quantity and perceived 
quality purchased. This data has been used to examine the consequences of cannabis 
legalisation in California22, the effect of law enforcement on cannabis price23, the elasticity of 
cannabis demand24 and even to inform on the financial implications of the legalisation of 
cannabis in Canada25. Data on cannabis prices crowdsourced from the PriceofWeed.com, 
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however, has never been examined outside of the USA and Canada. This article shows the 
potential of crowdsourced data on cannabis prices in a country that, contrary to the US, has 
less nuanced sources of drug prices, with only a few composite estimates which are publicly 
available. Our analysis contributes to the current research on the UK’s cannabis market by 
providing several insights into cannabis flows, dealers’ behaviours and consumers’ 
purchasing habits using data crowdsourced from the PriceofWeed.com.  
 
Crowdsourcing the Price of Cannabis 
Crowdsourcing is a process that solicits help from a large pool of actors to support a project, 
either by contributing funds, skills, or information to help realize a goal, usually in exchange 
for promised recompense.26 As with any other social media platform, crowdsourcing allows 
users to create and share information with each other. However, unlike other forms of social 
media, such as Twitter or Facebook, crowdsourcing defines precise tasks – such as “solve this 
problem,” “fund this product,” or “contribute knowledge for this project” – that require 
support to complete.  
 The Price of Weed’s raison d'être is to crowdsource answers to the question: “What is 
marijuana really worth [in a particular location]?” The site encourages users to provide the 
prices paid for the benefit of the community, as to understand what the true value of the 
cannabis purchased is at any given location. By submitting information about their latest 
transactions, users contribute to the understanding of what the optimal price should be in their 
area. Users then provide information about their latest transaction for the same reason people 
contribute to Wikipedia. Users do not get any compensation for writing and editing 
Wikipedia articles except improved self-esteem through their contribution to the knowledge-
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base of the Wikipedia community. In the same way, people submitting information about 
cannabis purchases are happy to contribute and improve the knowledge-base of the cannabis 
user community. 
The Price of Weed’s homepage presents a data input form where users can submit 
their last purchase of marijuana (see Figure 1). The form asks the user to provide information 
about the location of the transaction, which is pre-populated based on the user’s IP address; 
quantity, with units including 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 grams, an ounce, a half ounce, a quarter of 
an ounce, and an eighth of an ounce; quality, with categories being low, medium, high; 
marijuana strain; and the purchase price. Below the data input form, the website reports a 
map showing the price of marijuana per ounce. Beneath the map, the platform shows the 
average price per ounce for high and medium quality marijuana in the location of the user’s 
purchase. Finally, the website reports the latest submissions reported by anonymous users, 
providing up-to-date information on location, price, quantity, quality, and date of sale. All 
prices are reported in US dollars (USD), although users may use different currencies for their 
submissions. Information on specific cannabis strain types, although collected, is not reported 


















We gathered a real-time dataset of price entries for the UK from February 2015 through June 
2016 by scraping the data from the Price of Weed on a daily basis.27 The Price of Weed 
website, in fact, does not provide the entire dataset but only the latest 15 transactions per 
country, meaning that daily collection is necessary in order to ensure that all records are 
collected. The data collection produced an initial sample of 2,146 entries. To create a 
standard point of comparison, we converted the prices, reported in United States Dollars 
(USD/ $) to what they would be at the gram amount. Observations with prices lower than 
$0.30 per gram and higher than $35 were dropped given their abnormal deviance from the 
mean. All transactions were then converted from USD to Great British Pounds (GBP/ £) 
using the daily exchange rate provided by the Bank of England. The final dataset contains 
2,009 observations. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for different transactions. 
 












1 468 11.0 4.7 34.9 3.8 
3.5 303 19.8 5.2 100.4 10.5 
5 235 37.9 3.2 132.9 18.2 
7 170 50.7 2.6 200.6 24.2 
10 95 48.8 6.3 250.3 50.1 
14 123 84.4 3.3 225.0 41.4 
15 7 65.0 13.0 183.7 67.8 
20 13 25.8 13.0 129.7 32.0 
25 5 47.5 16.8 98.9 35.2 
28 590 160.7 29.5 501.0 72.9 
Total 2009 69.4 2.6 501.0 75.6 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on PriceofWeed.com data 
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 A web scraper is custom-built software that collects data from websites containing the sought after 
data, in this case information on cannabis price. The scraper extracts data from those pages and 
collects all the information into a database. 
This data shows the large variation in the sample which is not unexpected. Illicit drug prices 
per unit of measure may vary from transaction to transaction, between places, and over time. 
Variability does not reduce the data’s analytical purchase, and is common in licit 
marketplaces as well. For instance, the retail price of oil can show different values within the 
same city and is far more expensive in some parts of the world than in others; nevertheless, it 
is common to speak about “the price of oil.” Whether speaking about the “the price of oil” or 
“the price of drugs,” it is not important that drugs/oil are sold everywhere at the same price, 
rather it is important that prices are sufficiently linked thereby making it possible to identify a 
benchmark value28. 
 
Comparing the Price of Weed data to other sources 
We checked the validity of the price data collected by comparing it to alternative available 
sources of data on drug price. In their review, Bryan et al identify three main sources of data 
for drug prices in the UK 29: 
1) Data generated by the National Crime Agency (NCA) and forensic services; 
2) a survey of drug and alcohol services, police forces and service user groups conducted 
by the charity DrugWise (previously known as DrugScope); 
3) and, a survey of drug users by the Independent Drug Monitoring Unit (IDMU). 
The data provided by the NCA are collected and collated from police forces throughout the 
UK, who obtain information using a variety of means, including test purchases, prisoner 
interviews, and informants’ reports. The NCA does not publish the data itself but does 
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provide them in standardized format to international bodies such as the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA).  
DrugWise is a charity that offers advice and support to organizations in the drug 
sectors. DrugWise has surveyed local social workers, Drug Action Team staff, and police 
officers working in drug squads. The interviews were conducted mainly by telephone but also 
email and face-to-face. Average prices from the surveys are published on the DrugWise 
webpage.30 
The Independent Drug Monitoring Unit is a company that monitors the state of the 
drugs market in the UK and provides expert witnesses in court cases. They conduct an annual 
survey which collects information on drug consumption and prices paid by drug users who 
volunteer to take the survey (mainly online). For 2015, the year used in our comparison of the 
main drug price data sources in the UK to the data collected from the Price of Weed, the 
sample is composed by 333 observations collected in twelve different regions in the UK31. 
Several issues complicate our ability to directly compare these three official data 
sources and the Price of Weed data. First, these sources do not publish in detail methods of 
data collection or authentication. However, from the information provided, it is clear that the 
methods used differ widely for each dataset. Each data provider uses varying sampling 
strategies whereby they conduct interviews differently, and survey distinct geographical 
areas.  
Second, cannabis is not a standardised product, so research on “cannabis” may 
include a wide array of products, which are not studied similarly across the datasets. For 




 The regions surveyed are: London, South East, South West, Midlands, Wales, Yorkshire and the 
Humber, North West, North East, Scotland, Ireland, and others.  
instance, the IDMU collects information for seven different types of cannabis whereas 
EMCDDA, UNODC, and DrugWise report a much more limited selection.  
Third, the complete datasets are not publicly available and the only provide point 
estimates at gram- (EMCDDA and UNODC), eighth- (IDMU), quarter- (DrugWise) and 
ounce-level (IDMU). Given the lack of harmonisation among the datasets differences among 
the four sources are expected. However, this exercise can indicate if crowd-sourced values 
are roughly in line with those reported by other sources.  
Table 2 presents the results of this comparison. While prices for Price of Weed are 
based on the users’ assessment of the products’ quality; it is unclear whether the EMCDDA 
and the UNODC price estimations reflect lower, medium, upper, or average quality estimates. 
Accordingly, prices reported in the EMCDDA and the UNODC reports may refer to the 
average price of cannabis products of low/high potency, or the minimum/maximum price for 
a gram of cannabis of average quality. Despite the imperfect comparison, the prices per gram 
reported by the Price of Weed data are roughly in line with those reported by the EMCDDA 
and the UNODC. Among the official data sets, prices for cannabis range from £3.20 to £10 
per gram (excluding the UNODC’s estimate of £20 for cannabis resin). The price per gram 
according to the Price of Weed data also lies below the upper value of this range. 
Table 2. Price of cannabis (GBP) in the UK according to the Price of Weed, the EMCDDA, the UNODC, the IDMU and DrugWise 
Source Average per gram An eighth A fourth An ounce Low Medium High Medium High Medium High Medium High 
PoWa  7.2 7.2 19.9 19.6 47.6 56.2 152 170.9 
 (±0.2) (±0.3) (±1.4) (±2.4) (±3.9) (±7.4) (±7.9) (±8.6) 
EMCDDA Cannabis herb 3.3  5.7       Cannabis resin 3.2  4.3       
UNODCb 
Cannabis resin 10 10 20       
Cannabis herb 5 5 10       
Skunk  5        
IDMU 
Black    23.8   107.5 
Soap-Bar    21.3   75.4 
Other Moroccan    21.4   92.3 
Other Hash    31.5   125 
Skunk    28.3   216 
Homegrown/Leaf    12.9   67.1 
Imported Bush    24.1   132.9 
DrugWise 
Herbal Cannabis 




(High standard)      
55 
  
*Price of Weed: 2015/2016; EMCDDA: 2014 (cannabis resin) and 2013 (cannabis herb); UNODC: 2012; DrugWise: 2016; IDMU: 2015. 
a
 We do report value for low quality given the few observations (n.= 84) compared to medium (n. =1,368) and high quality (n. = 557) 
b




The IDMU reports data for an eighth of an ounce (~3.5 grams) and an ounce (~28 grams). 
Data refers approximately to the same year (Price of Weed: 2015/16; IDMU: 2015) but 
differs in terms of cannabis product. The IDMU reports prices per ounce for several strains 
that range from £67.10 to a maximum of £216. According to the Price of Weed, the average 
price for an ounce of cannabis is £152 (±£7.90) for medium-quality and £171 (±£8.60) for 
high-quality. The range provided by the IDMU is wide and lacks nuance; nonetheless, the 
prices reported by the Price of Weed fall within the IDMU range allowing us to see that the 
prices observed are reasonable when compared to public measurements. The paucity of low-
grade cannabis transactions reported in the Price of Weed data (there were four) coupled with 
the fact that that medium- and high-grade products are close in price, could suggest that the 
quality of product available on market is relatively high overall, supporting the observed 
trend of relatively small-scale domestic producers competing with each other for market 
share, and thus providing relatively good quality product32. 
The last comparison is with DrugWise for a quarter ounce of cannabis. DrugWise and 
Price of Weed report prices for different cannabis products but approximately the same year. 
Despite this, the two datasets seem to report similar results. The minimum price reported by 
DrugWise is between £27 and £55 per quarter ounce. Price of Weed reports an average cost 
of £47.60 (±£3.90) for medium-quality and £56 (±£7.40) for high-quality cannabis. 
Crowdsourced values are closer to the upper value and roughly in line with the source of 
comparison.  
As expected, there are differences in the reported prices between the Price of Weed 
data and the other sources surveyed, which could be due to the different year of analysis, 
product varieties, potency, or variance in the methods of data collection. Prices can change 
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quite noticeably across years 33 and, as comparative studies in criminology show, 
idiosyncratic systems of data collection produce different results34. One of the main factors 
limiting the comparison of the Price of Weed data with existing data sets is the absence of 
information about specific types of cannabis products from the Price of Weed. In fact, it just 
reports if the cannabis purchased was of a low, medium, or high quality based on the user’s 
assessment, rather than specifying whether the product is herbal, hash, or some other 
cannabis product, such as wax. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the Price of Weed 
dataset cannot be used but that it cannot, in its current form, wholly replace some of the 
nuances the existing sources provide on specific product types.  
 
Results 
The next section presents our findings from the Price of Weed data in the United Kingdom. 
They are organized around three themes relevant to understanding the dynamics of drug 
markets: trafficking flows, quantity discount, and purchasing habits. 
 
Trafficking Flows 
Illicit drug prices increase as one moves away from drug import sources35. Several studies 
have used systematic observations on drug prices to infer drug trafficking flows – that is, the 
route a drug is trafficked along – and to calculate price gradients, that is, changes in price 
over the trafficking flow. In a series of papers, Chandra and colleagues used drug price 
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information to identify heroin and cocaine trafficking flows across European countries36 and 
within the United States 37. Lahaie et al.38 found that the price of heroin in France tends to 
increase moving away from the border with the Netherlands, which is acknowledged to be 
the main entry route for heroin into Western Europe. Similarly, Caulkins and Bond39 
estimated that the price of marijuana in the United States tends to increase between $325 and 
$475 per pound per 1,000 miles travelled as the product moves north from the Mexican 
border. 
Prices in the UK cannabis market behave in a similar way: the further away from a 
southern shipping port, the more a cannabis sells for. Figure 3 plots the average price per 
gram for 52 cities in the UK against their latitude40. This linear model is an approximation, 
but it fits the data reasonably well (R = .37; p < .001). The price per unit increases constantly 
moving from south to north reflecting shipping patterns in the UK. The figure indicates that it 
is likely that most cannabis shipments enter the UK from the south. Moving from the source 
of the supply to the north increases traffickers’ risk in terms of arrest or seizure given the 
needs to transport the product, stage the product, and finding a buyer.41 Accordingly, as we 
would expect, and as the data reflects, cannabis is more expensive in the northern part of the 
UK compared to the southern part of the country42.  
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Several indicators – in particular the Border Force’s (the United Kingdom’s border 
and customs agency) seizures of cannabis plants and cannabis products in the last 15 years – 
has pointed to the decline of the cannabis importation and the rise of UK-based production43. 
Figure 5 suggests that import still likely plays a determinant role in satisfying the internal 
demand for cannabis in the United Kingdom.  
 
Figure 3. Average price per gram of cannabis across UK and latitude 
 




Figure 3 suggests that despite the substantial growth of domestic cannabis plant cultivation, 
large quantities of cannabis are still imported from other countries 44. The Netherlands, in 
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particular, has been identified as having a determinant role on the importation of cannabis to 
the UK45. The Netherlands not only exports large quantities of high-quality, domestically 
produced cannabis to the UK but also works as a staging and distribution hub for the cannabis 
produced in other countries including Albania, Morocco and Afghanistan46. Traffickers can 
take advantage of the numerous ports of entry in southern Britain, including Southampton, 
Portsmouth, Dover, Tilbury and Harwich, as well as the Channel Tunnel to transport cannabis 
loads into the UK47.  
Given the number of variables in play, identifying the determinants of the price of 
cannabis is beyond the scope of this article. Future quantitative work should aim at assessing 
the influence of different factors (e.g. product quality, level of enforcement, etc.) in 
determining cannabis price. Moreover, since no model can perfectly fit the complexity and 
heterogeneity of cannabis market, ethnographic and qualitative studies are necessary to add a 
deeper understanding of local cannabis markets48. 
 
Quantity Discount 
In both licit and illicit marketplaces, customers buying in bulk receive a quantity discount. 
Merchants use discount prices to attract customers to buy more items and lessen stock, thus 
passing on the risk of possessing, and potentially losing stock before they are compensated, 
due to theft, disaster, or any other occurrence which would destroy the value of the stock. 
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Risk of arrest for cannabis dealers is probably the main factor explaining quantity discount49. 
A dealer who has an ounce of cannabis has two alternatives: (1) wholesale large quantities to 
a small group of willing buyers at a discounted overall rate50, or (2) retail small quantities to a 
large group of buyers in order to maximize profit. The second alternative increases the 
exposure to risk of arrest as it involves conducting more transactions, thus increasing 
visibility to law enforcement and competitors and/or keeping or selling the illicit substance 
for a relatively longer time period.  
The phenomenon of quantity discount has been observed for heroin, cocaine, and 
cannabis in Australia, Canada, France and the US51. There is not, however, information on 
what kind of quantity discount may be expected in the UK, which we will now show.  
Table 3 and Table 4 show the average price per gram for different transactions sizes 
(a gram, a quarter, a half-ounce and an ounce). Transactions for 10, 15, 20, and 25 grams are 
dropped because of the paucity of observations as well as an eighth of an ounce and 5-gram 
transactions because those quantities falling in between a gram and a quarter ounce. Our 
analysis also excludes low-quality transactions given the low number of observations (n = 
124).  
Both purchases of medium- (Table 3) and high-quality (Table 4) cannabis products 
show that the greater the quantity of cannabis bought in the UK, the lower the per unit price. 
The average price for a gram of cannabis of medium-quality is £10.90. The average price for 
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an ounce of cannabis of the same quality is £152.50 (£5.40 per unit). Similarly, the price for 
gram transactions of high-quality cannabis is £11.80 while the average price per unit for 
ounce transactions is £6.10. This means that the price per unit is 50% cheaper when bought as 
an ounce than when bought as a gram.  
 
Table 3. Average price per transaction, price per gram and number of observation for 




Price per gram 
(GBP) 
Observations 
A gram 10.9 10.9 357 
A quarter ounce (~7 grams) 47.6 6.8 104 
A half ounce (~14 grams) 82.6 5.9 82 
An ounce (~28 grams) 152.5 5.4 338 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on PriceofWeed.com data 
 
 
Table 4 Average price per transaction, price per gram and number of observation for high 




Price per gram 
(GBP) 
Observations 
A gram 11.8 11.8 82 
A quarter ounce (~7 
grams) 
56.2 8.0 63 
A half ounce (~14 grams) 91.3 6.5 36 
An ounce (~28 grams) 170.9 6.1 237 




Purchasing habits can heavily influence the estimates of the value of illicit drug markets since 
those estimates are typically based on retail prices multiplied by estimated volume of sales52. 
Estimates of the size of the illicit drug market are particularly relevant for policy makers and 
law enforcement agencies as user’s spending on illicit drugs may increase crime and fuels 
corruption53. Variation over years in the distribution of the purchase of cannabis can however 
distort trends of the estimate of the value of the market. For instance, the quantity of cannabis 
consumed at time � can be the same consumed at time � + 1. But if in � + 1 users tend to buy 
cannabis in lower quantities, the estimate of the size of the illicit drug market is biased 
downward and the trend distorted. Similarly, two regions may have the same market volume 
with similar tiered pricing but generate different revenues if users have different purchasing 
habits. One needs to take into account distribution of retail purchase and quantity discount in 
the estimate of the illicit drug market 54. The Price of Weed platform could represent a useful 
tool to monitor the typical volume and prices of purchases made by cannabis users.  
Table 5 reports the eight most typical purchases observed in the Price of Weed dataset 
and Figure A in the appendix the distribution of cannabis purchases.55 Most of the 
transactions are small purchases. The most typical transaction reported is for £10; 41% of all 
transactions are smaller than £20. Bigger transactions are instead less typical. Purchases of 
£50, £100, and £65 account for just 12% of the total of the observations. Sixty-six percent of 
all transactions are below £100. 
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 Table 5. Typical purchase of cannabis in UK. 
Purchase (GBP) Observations Percentage  Cumulative percentage 
£10 395 20% 20% 
£15 170 8% 28% 
£20 155 8% 36% 
£5 102 5% 41% 
£35 96 5% 46% 
£50 90 4% 50% 
£100 85 4% 54% 
£65 82 4% 58% 
… … … … 
Total 2009 100% 100% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on PriceofWeed.com data 
 
Table 6 reports the eight most common transaction prices and the corresponding 
amount of cannabis purchased at those price points.56 The results show a clear concentration 
in the amount of cannabis that the same monetary transaction can buy but also a considerable 
variation for some of them. For instance, 89% of those spending £10 in a transaction 
purchased a gram. Similarly, most of the users spending between £15 and £20 received an 
eighth of an ounce, and most of the transactions between £65 and £100 were for an ounce of 
cannabis.  
Some observations seem more problematic. According to the data a purchase of £355 
can buy anywhere from a gram (1%), 5 grams (60%), to an ounce (15%). Quality does not 
seem to influence this as medium- and high-quality cannabis show almost the same 
distribution. It is possible that purchases of high quantities at relatively low prices could be 
due to a personal connection with a supplier that allows the consumer to get a below market 
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 The analysis removed purchases of 15g, 20g and 25g due to the low number of observations (n. = 
16) 
price due to “mates rates.” Although some transactions present a large variation most of them 
have clear concentration on some quantities and there is a strong positive correlation between 
spending and quantity.  
Table 6: Most typical purchases in UK and corresponding quantity of cannabis bought 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on PriceofWeed.com data 
 
Discussion 
Crowd-sourced transaction data presents some new insights into the UK cannabis 
market that traditional data sources are not able to provide. First, this study has shown that 
there exists trafficking flow illustrated by increasing prices for cannabis within the UK from 
south to north, which suggests the ongoing presence of foreign product in the UK 
marketplace. The growth of domestic cannabis plant cultivation is likely to affect this pattern 
in the future. The analysis presented here offers a tool for law enforcement authorities to 
monitor this trend and understand the changing nature of the United Kingdom’s cannabis 
market. Second, it shows the extent to which a quantity discount is granted to consumers. As 
observed for other legal and illegal goods, buying in bulk reduce the price per unit. Cannabis 
sellers are willing to reduce profits per unit in order to reduce their exposure to risks of arrest. 
Third, this research indicates the purchasing habits of cannabis users, helping us to 
understand whether larger or smaller transactions are comparatively common in a given 
location. Although the dataset is unlikely to be fully representative of the whole cannabis 
Purchase (£) A gramAn Eighth5 Grams A Fourth10 GramsA Half Ounce An Ounce Total
10 89% 7% 1% 0% 3% 0% 0% 100%
15 24% 57% 10% 3% 2% 4% 0% 100%
20 24% 67% 6% 2% 1% 0% 0% 100%
5 35% 16% 12% 6% 27% 4% 0% 100%
35 1% 11% 60% 11% 2% 1% 15% 100%
50 0% 7% 50% 29% 6% 6% 3% 100%
100 0% 1% 4% 1% 19% 20% 55% 100%
65 0% 1% 9% 11% 12% 21% 46% 100%
market, the results suggest that most cannabis transactions are small in terms of price and 
volume, with £10 buying a gram being the most typical transaction reported. 
Crowdsourcing could be used not only to provide a static snapshot of an illicit market, 
as it the case for the results presented here, but also used as a tool to monitor the market in 
near real time. Data from crowdsourcing platforms such as the PriceofWeed.com could show 
how buyers, sellers, and traffickers respond to law enforcement interventions or drug policy 
changes by evaluating shifts in supply, demand, and price. For instance, traffickers can adapt 
to interdiction programs by shifting to alternative routes. This form of displacement is often 
referred to as the “balloon effect,” and suggests that stronger law enforcement actions in one 
location will result in the displacement of drug trafficking activities to another location57. 
Similarly, law enforcement actions or changes in drug policy (e.g. reclassification of some 
substances, changes threshold limits to discern sales from personal use, etc.) can affect users’ 
and dealers’ behaviors and push them to sell or buy in bigger or smaller quantities. Given the 
inability to understand these shifts with existing research products, crowdsourcing is a tool 
that could supplement the limited data available to law enforcement agencies, public health 
institutions, policy makers and NGOs on the effect of such interventions, though practitioners 
should be cautious in using the Price of Weed data given its array of limitations.  
There are, in fact, significant limitations in the use of the Price of Weed data. First, 
this is not a random or representative sample. The transaction data are self-reported by 
relatively unknown participants and not a random sample of the cannabis purchasing 
population 58. To date, we know little about those who provide information and the data 
collected might not be representative of the entire cannabis population. We have no 
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demographic information or an indication of a user’s typical consumption. The anonymity 
granted by the platform encourages users to submit genuine information but, simultaneously, 
deprives researchers from any sociodemographic or economic information about those using 
the platform. While it may be technically possible to ask for such information, an increase in 
requesting potentially identifying information could deter users from participating. 
Attempting to estimate likely users by analyzing users from other crowdsourcing platforms 
would not be viable, since the use of these platforms depends on the platforms’ purpose and 
the way in which they collect data (online, telephone, etc.)59. 
 However, we know from previous studies that social media platform usage rates vary 
by sociodemographic and economic conditions. Male, younger people, and certain 
occupational groups (e.g. managerial, administrative, and professional occupations) have 
higher participation60. This can suggest that participants of the Price of Weed website are 
likely to have relatively high income and being able to buy better products. Conversely, 
incarcerated and homeless populations, who may have a higher rate of drug use, are likely to 
be underrepresented in this sample61. Clearly, future research should try to better understand 
the population of individuals participating on these sorts of platforms. 
Second, there is no ability to protect against false or inaccurate submissions, 
potentially input by anyone purposefully or erroneously (i.e. typos). Moreover, there is an 
issue regarding the independence of the submissions. The same users can report multiple 
submissions of transactions taking place at different times, however there is no way of 
determining if this is the behavior observed. The inability for researchers to fully understand 
the participating population makes it difficult to test for errors and weight for over or under 
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representation. We triangulated the crowdsourced data with other traditional sources in order 
to check its reliability. This comparison was hampered by lack of harmonization among the 
different datasets. Nonetheless, we have demonstrated that the Price of Weed data do not 
deviate from the ranges reported by these other sources 
Third, cannabis is an experience good62 which means that buyers may have a limited 
knowledge of the quality of the product before they consume it. Users may have a better 
knowledge of the product after developing a history of consumption. Moreover, users may 
view quality relevant to the best they have consumed, with personal baselines for comparison 
varying widely. Accordingly, the self-reporting nature of the information on quality can be 
inaccurate and subjective. For instance, what it is considered high-quality cannabis in 
Edinburgh may be considered as low-quality cannabis in Brighton. Evrard, Legleye, and 
Cadet-Taïrou63 asked drug users the perceived quality of cocaine that they were consuming 
and then analyzed them in a laboratory. They discovered that “users were not good at 
assessing the actual purity of the cocaine they had used”64. Similarly, Decorte65 concludes 
that users have an incomplete knowledge of the quality of the substance they use even after 
its consumption. This can help to explain the little difference in the price per unit for 
medium- and high-quality cannabis according to the data gathered from the Price of Weed 
website. Additional and more objective information on the concentration of 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the primary psychoactive cannabinoid in cannabis, and 
cannabidiol (CBD), the other significant, although non-psychoactive cannabinoid present in 
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cannabis, is needed to make sure that we are comparing similar products66. Perhaps more 
importantly, the last years have seen a proliferation of cannabis products, including marijuana 
edibles, oils, and vaping products. Future data collection efforts should consider the 
heterogeneity of cannabis-based products. 
 
Conclusions  
The analyses provide encouraging results in the use of crowdsourcing for researching 
transactions and behaviors within illicit drug markets. Our work has shown that mining the 
publicly available, crowdsourced data from Price of Weed can help researchers understand 
patterns that are otherwise indiscernible from public reports. In countries like the UK, where 
such research outputs are lacking, such strategies may present one of the few ways in which 
researchers can proceed with such inquires. Moreover, this work illustrates that it may be 
possible to develop crowdsourcing instruments that effectively gather information from some 
traditionally hard-to-reach and/or deviant populations. Importantly, the information gathered 
via the internet can be used to extrapolate data regarding the transactions involving higher-
level groups, such as wholesalers, that traditional methods often struggle to evaluate67. 
The crowdsourcing platform used in this article is not ideal for researchers, rendering 
several limitations on the data collected and the inferences made. Accordingly, practitioners 
and social scientists can respond to their research needs by starting to develop their own 
crowdsourcing platforms. An optimized platform could provide data also for other substances 
including new psychoactive substances, synthetic drugs, cocaine, and similar products. 
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Further considerations could include the need to educate users on the quality and type of the 
product they are consuming, by providing cues such as photos to help identify products and 
estimate amounts, descriptions of a product’s appearance and aroma, descriptions of the 
effect after a drug’s consumption, or techniques on how to do simple chemical analysis for 
substance purity. Such efforts are likely to provide a better matching between the reported 
and actual quality of the product but cannot have the precision of forensic analysis. 
Keeping the ongoing limitations of crowdsourcing in mind, it is a methodology that 
should be used to complement and augment, rather than replace, conventional sources, such 
as law enforcement and forensic data, in countries with a tradition of data collection and 
analysis on illicit markets. Nonetheless, crowdsourcing could provide a starting point for 
analysis in countries that do not have robust recording practices within criminal justice 
agencies, acting as a substitute of traditional data sources. In such circumstances, 
crowdsourcing may provide the drug-related data researchers require to study drug markets in 
a way that otherwise would not be possible.  
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